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[W]e can attest to the vital importance of candor and confidentiality 
in the Solicitor General’s decisionmaking process . . . .  Our 
decisionmaking process require[s] the unbridled, open exchange of 
ideas—an exchange that simply cannot take place if attorneys have 
reason to fear that their private recommendations are not private at 
all, but vulnerable to public disclosure.  Attorneys inevitably will 
hesitate before giving their honest, independent analysis if their 
opinions are not safeguarded from future disclosure.  High-level 
decisionmaking requires candor, and candor in turn requires 
confidentiality.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Government lawyers are regulated by the ethical rules of the state 
in which they are members of the bar.2  In most states, professional 
responsibility rules of confidentiality do “not distinguish between 
government and private sector lawyers.”3  As a result, government 
lawyers are under an ethical obligation to comply with their clients’ 
instructions.4  The scope of protections provided by asserting the 
attorney-client privilege in the face of a grand jury subpoena, 
however, is not clear.5  Given that over 40,000 lawyers serve our 
federal government in some capacity, a clear ethical obligation should 
be provided.6  An expanding government in the current regulatory 
regime will require more lawyers to provide counsel to government 
 
 1. Letter from Seth P. Waxman et al., Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, to Patrick 
Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (June 24, 2002), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-10-07/html/CREC-2002-10-07-pt1-
PgS10031.htm. 
 2. Jennifer Wang, Note, Raising the Stakes at the White House: Legal and 
Ethical Duties of the White House Counsel, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 115, 131–32 
(1994). 
 3. See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2007). 
 4. William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government 
Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 HOW. L.J. 539, 
563 (1986). 
 5. John Damin, Comment, Thawing the Chill Between Government Attorneys 
and Their Clients: The Need for Legislative Intervention in Protecting the 
Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 1009, 1010–11 (2007).  
 6. See Cornell W. Clayton, Introduction: Politics and the Legal Bureaucracy, in 
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL 
POLITICS 1 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995). 
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officials so the government can “function efficiently and effectively.”7  
Leaving the attorney-client privilege without clear boundaries for 
these lawyers is a cause for great professional concern. 
Government lawyers advise on policy issues, issue legal advice on 
various matters, and serve as counselors at the highest levels of 
government.8  Shouldn’t the privilege apply to them in the same 
manner as those lawyers serving in the private sector?  What if the 
government official seeking legal advice may face incarceration due 
to illegal policies or public corruption?  Some would point to the 
recent “torture memos” as a means of cautioning against a desire for 
equal ethical obligations.9  Others suggest that whistleblower statutes 
and other mandated reporting requirements reduce the efficacy of 
this argument.10  However, a different set of rules for government 
lawyers can be confusing when implemented in practice.11  Further, 
systematically reducing the privilege could have great consequences 
for the profession of lawyering.  As Michael Greco, former President 
of the American Bar Association (ABA) stated, 
In the end, erosion of the attorney-client privilege will marginalize 
the lawyer and the lawyer’s ability to defend liberty and pursue 
justice.  Erosion of the lawyer-client relationship will lead to the 
diminishment of the lawyer’s role in society because clients will no 
longer entrust confidences with and seek counsel from their lawyers.  
And such diminishment will lead to a less effective, less respected, 
and greatly reduced lawyer’s role in society not only in particular 
client matters, but more broadly.12 
 
 7. See Nathan P. Hansen, Note, Attempting to Cure Conflicts of Interests in the 
Federal Government: One Federal Agency’s Attempt to Recapture the Trust of 
Americans, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 163, 164 (2005). 
 8. W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2009); see also Peter M. Shane, Executive Branch 
Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: The Challenges for Conscientious Legal Analysis, 5 J. 
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 507, 511 (2012). 
 9. See generally Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the 
Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 10. James E. Moliterno, The Federal Government Lawyer’s Duty to Breach 
Confidentiality, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 633, 634 (2005). 
 11. Walter Pincus, No Clear Legal Answer: The Uncertain State of the 
Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 269 (2001) (arguing that 
recent decisions by several circuit courts have left “government attorneys . . . in a 
legal no-man’s land”). 
 12. Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, Address at Am. College of Trial 
Lawyers on Defense of Attorney Client Privilege (Apr. 8, 2006). 
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Although the notion of an attorney-client privilege for government 
lawyers is relatively new,13 the underlying principles remain the 
same.14  Dean Wigmore provides one of the fundamental descriptions 
of the privilege in his oft-cited treatise: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional 
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating 
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at 
his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or 
by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.15 
Government lawyers inherently share the “same broad 
confidentiality obligation” as private sector attorneys.16  However, 
this obligation is “tempered by the fact that [the lawyer] has a deeper 
obligation to the public.”17  Completely abrogating the privilege 
would have the effect of placing the government lawyer at a 
disadvantage in both civil and criminal litigation.18  Courts have not 
been clear as to how far the privilege should extend given the unique 
obligations of government lawyers.19  Before 1996, there was no legal 
precedent available on whether the government attorney-client 
privilege applied in the criminal context.20  This is an important 
consideration in the assertion of the privilege for government clients 
 
 13. See Patricia E. Salkin & Allyson Phillips, Eliminating Political Maneuvering: 
A Light in the Tunnel for the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 39 IND. L. REV. 
561, 564 (2006) (noting that prior to 1967 “there was little application of the privilege 
in the government context at all”). 
 14. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE MANUAL 348 (4th ed. 1986) (explaining that “[o]rganizations like 
corporations and government entities may claim privilege”). 
 15. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 
(John T. McNaughton rev. 1961); see also Kerri R. Blumenauer, Note, Privileged or 
Not? How the Current Application of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege 
Leaves the Government Feeling Unprivileged, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 75, 79 (2006) 
(listing the elements of the privilege). 
 16. Clark, supra note 3, at 1035.  
 17. Jack B. Weinstein, Judicial Notice and the Duty to Disclose Adverse 
Information, 51 IOWA L. REV. 807, 810 (1966). 
 18. 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
SECOND § 191 (1994) (stating that “[d]enial of the privilege would put public entities 
at an unfair disadvantage in both criminal prosecutions and civil litigation”). 
 19. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 
1997) (holding that privilege did not extend to the White House), and In re Lindsey, 
158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the President could not invoke the 
privilege before a federal grand jury), with In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 
527 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Office of the Governor could invoke the privilege 
in a federal grand jury investigation). 
 20. Amanda Dickmann, Note, In re Lindsey: A Needless Void in the Government 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 33 IND. L. REV. 291, 299–300 (1999). 
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because “they need the candid legal advice that only the attorney-
client privilege can guarantee.”21 
This idea then ignites the debate as to who exactly is the 
government attorney’s client.22  Among the possibilities listed by one 
commentator are the public, the government as a whole, branches of 
government, agencies, and agency heads.23  Others have suggested the 
President as a potential client due to his role as the head of the 
Executive branch.24  The ABA has clarified that the duty of an 
organizational lawyer, and therefore representation of a client, 
extends to governmental organizations as well.25  Identifying the client 
is critical, as it serves as the “triggering event” for a wide gamut of 
professional responsibilities.26 
A former Attorney General argued for recognizing a higher calling 
to the public in the performance of a government lawyer’s duty.27  
This idea that a government lawyer possesses “a higher duty to the 
public is not limited to the criminal context.”28  One rationale for this 
duty could be that the privilege serves to “encourag[e] internal 
 
 21. Adam M. Chud, Note, In Defense of the Government Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1682, 1686 (1999). 
 22. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who “Owns” the Government’s Attorney-
Client Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. REV. 473, 489 (1998) (“The client is the United States 
Government.”); Bryan S. Gowdy, Note, Should the Federal Government Have an 
Attorney-Client Privilege?, 51 FLA. L. REV. 695, 710–11 (1999) (recognizing courts’ 
assumption that “only the government entity, and not its individual employees, has 
the power to invoke or waive the privilege”).  Scholars have long debated who 
qualifies as the client of the government civil litigator. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Essay, 
Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1293 (1987) (arguing that the agency or department should be seen as the client). 
 23. Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer As Whistleblower: Confidentiality and 
Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991). 
 24. James R. Harvey, III, Note, Loyalty in Government Action Litigation: 
Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1569, 1570 (1996). 
 25. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 9 (2012) (“The duty defined 
in this Rule applies to governmental organizations.”).  The ABA also notes that 
defining the client in the government context is an arduous task. Id. 
 26. Joshua Panas, Note, The Miguel Estrada Confirmation Hearings and the 
Client of A Government Lawyer, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 543 (2004). 
 27. Griffin Bell, The Attorney-General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer 
and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1069 (1978) 
(“Although our client is the government, in the end we serve a more important 
constituency: the American people.”). 
 28. Jesselyn Radack, The Government Attorney-Whistleblower and the Rule of 
Confidentiality: Compatible at Last, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 140 (2003). 
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investigations . . . and ensur[es] future compliance with the law.”29  
Others acknowledge the historical justifications for serving the public 
interest offered by courts and legislatures.30  Further, it is argued that 
the “government lawyer represents a public-abiding client whose 
genuine interests” cannot be protected “by the same level of secrecy” 
as a private client.31  For state and municipal government lawyers, this 
also causes unique concerns when determining whose interests to 
serve during representation.32   
Another unique circumstance facing government lawyers is the 
divide over whether the attorney-client privilege can be equally 
exerted in civil and criminal cases.33  Most courts have assumed the 
privilege exists in areas involving civil litigation.34  The Supreme 
Court has insisted that there is “there is no case authority” justifying a 
different application “in criminal and civil cases.”35  However, there 
exists a circuit split regarding the assertion of the government 
attorney-client privilege before a federal grand jury.36 
The Eighth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 
recognized the existence of a government attorney-client privilege but 
 
 29. Lisa E. Toporek, Comment, “Bad Politics Makes Bad Law”: A Comment on 
the Eighth Circuit’s Approach to the Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege, 86 
GEO. L.J. 2421, 2428 (1998). 
 30. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and 
Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 794–97 
(2000). 
 31. Moliterno, supra note 10, at 634.  
 32. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2005) (involving city 
police department promotion process); State ex rel Thomas v. Schneider, 130 P.3d 
991 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (involving testimony by attorney before grand jury); 
Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 2007) 
(involving conflict with public records law and privilege).  
 33. See Patricia E. Salkin, Beware: What You Say to Your (Government) Lawyer 
May Be Held Against You: The Erosion of Government Attorney-Client 
Confidentiality, 35 URB. LAW. 283, 289–90 (2003) (asserting that there is a “sharp 
distinction” between applying the privilege in civil and criminal cases despite the 
warnings this would create a “uncertain privilege”). 
 34. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 532–33 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 
several cases to support the assumption); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1271 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). 
 35. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408–09 (1998) (noting that 
only “one commentator ventures such a suggestion”). 
 36. Compare In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (holding that the President could not 
invoke the privilege before a federal grand jury), and In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that privilege did not extend to 
the White House), with In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (holding that the 
Office of the Governor could invoke the privilege in a federal grand jury 
investigation). 
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did not find that it extended to the federal grand jury context.37  The 
court’s rationale focused on a weighing of interests and an assertion 
that the public interest is best served by not recognizing the privilege 
in “criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of public 
officials.”38  The D.C. Circuit in In re Lindsey also ruled against the 
privilege utilizing a balancing test.39  There, the court found that the 
necessity of open government and the sake of the public interest 
outweighed the potential harms of “chill[ing] some communications 
between government officials and government lawyers.”40  The 
Seventh Circuit, in a case involving state officials, also ruled that the 
privilege does not extend because government lawyers have a 
“responsibility to act in the public interest.”41  On the other hand, the 
Second Circuit has held that the government attorney-client privilege 
does exist and should be extended in the federal grand jury context.42 
Part I of this Note explores the history and fundamental 
justifications of the attorney-client privilege.  Further, it looks at the 
evolution of the attorney-client privilege as an organizational 
privilege.  Finally, this Part focuses on the limitations of the privilege 
and its impact on public policy considerations.  It specifically 
highlights the crime-fraud exception as one of the paramount 
limitations on the attorney-client privilege. 
Part II of this Note will explore the rationales of both courts and 
commentators rejecting the government attorney-client privilege in 
this context.  The rationales supporting an extension of the 
government attorney-client privilege will then be presented for 
analysis. 
Part III offers a solution for government lawyers who seek to assert 
the attorney-client privilege.  First, it is paramount that government 
lawyers’ clients be clearly identified in the beginning of their 
representation.  To facilitate this process and remove the murkiness 
that exists, this Note suggests that the client should be defined as the 
government organization represented by the duly appointed 
constituents the lawyer seeks to represent.  By limiting the 
representation to this capacity, the lawyer can effectively counsel his 
 
 37. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910. 
 38. Id. at 921. 
 39. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 40. Id. at 1276. 
 41. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 294 (7th 
Cir. 2002). 
 42. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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or her client and avoid the uncertainty of trying to ascertain what is 
“in the public interest.”  Second, this Note also rejects the balancing 
test offered by some commentators as impractical and not logically 
supported by the traditional principles of the attorney-client privilege.  
Additionally, this Note disputes the idea that the government duty of 
an official implicates a reduction of the privilege in a criminal context.  
Finally, this Note argues that a faithful application of the crime-fraud 
exception would allow the “twin aims” of public interest to be served.  
A strict adherence to the crime-fraud exception still allows the client 
to maintain confidentiality and preserve the ethical integrity 
demanded by public service.  It also serves to negate any need for 
special procedures because the crime-fraud exception serves the 
necessary limiting function. 
I.  ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE BACKGROUND AND POLICY 
JUSTIFICATIONS 
This Part is intended to provide a brief introduction to the 
attorney-client privilege.  To fully understand the role of the 
attorney-client privilege for government lawyers, “a thorough review 
of the private attorney-client privilege is necessary.”43  This Part will 
examine the historical background and policy justifications of the 
attorney-client privilege, recognize the unique nature of entities 
claiming the privilege, and finally discuss several limitations placed on 
the privilege. 
A. Historical Background and Constitutional Justifications 
The attorney-client privilege has deep historical roots in the 
profession of lawyering.44  Dean Wigmore suggested the privilege was 
“unquestioned” in Elizabethan times and was the “oldest of the 
privileges for confidential communications.”45  It was originally 
thought to be a way to protect “the oath and honor of the attorney 
 
 43. Todd A. Ellinwood, “In the Light of Reason and Experience”: The Case for 
A Strong Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1291, 1296 
(2001). 
 44. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between 
Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928) (“Advocates equally from very 
ancient times could not be called as witnesses against their clients while the case was 
in progress. Cicero in prosecuting the Roman governor of Sicily regrets that he 
cannot summon the latter’s [attorney].”); see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & 
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 5.8 (2d ed. 1999). 
 45. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 
(John T. McNaughton rev. 1961). 
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rather than for the apprehensions of his client.”46  Blackstone stated 
in 1768 that no attorney should be forced to reveal secrets entrusted 
to him by virtue of his position.47  The Supreme Court acknowledged 
early on that the privilege serves as a “seal of secrecy” and is based 
“upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice” to 
allow for “assistance [that] can only be safely and readily availed of 
when free from the consequences or the apprehension of 
disclosure.”48 
Professor Hazard argues that the historical record is best served as 
an “invitation for reconsideration” of the strength and validity of the 
privilege.49  Other scholars have been resolute in their reliance upon 
the historical significance of the privilege.50  Despite the debate 
underlying the privilege’s historical foundations, Justice Holmes 
suggests that understanding the strength of this doctrine requires such 
an analysis.51 
In addition to the historical analysis of the privilege, there is also a 
recognition of the constitutional implications of the privilege, 
particularly in criminal cases.52  Courts have found Sixth Amendment 
violations when there is direct interference with the attorney-client 
privilege.53  In these cases, the concern is that for effective counsel to 
 
 46. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 47. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370 (1768). 
 48. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
 49. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978) (“But beyond this, the historical 
foundations of the privilege are not as firm as the tenor of Wigmore’s language 
suggests.  On the contrary, recognition of the privilege was slow and halting until 
after 1800 . . . .  Taken as a whole, the historical record is not authority for a broadly 
stated rule of privilege.”); see also 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 
5472 (1st ed. 2012) (“There is no adequate history of the attorney-client privilege.”). 
 50. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1998) (noting that “the attorney-client privilege has existed for hundreds of years”); 
Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 477, 480 (2002) (“Attorney-client privilege cases trace back to the 16th 
century.”). 
 51. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897) (“The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. 
History must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise 
scope of rules which it is our business to know.”). 
 52. See Joel D. Whitley, Comment, Protecting State Interests: Recognition of the 
State Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1536 (2005). 
 53. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977); United States v. 
Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Free two-way communication between client 
and attorney is essential if the professional assistance guaranteed by the sixth 
amendment is to be meaningful.”). 
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exist, “any advice received as a result of a defendant’s disclosure to 
counsel must be insulated from the government.”54  The privilege also 
draws its constitutional roots in the Fifth Amendment protections 
against self-incrimination.55  Scholars argue that the Fifth Amendment 
offers “perhaps the clearest support for the attorney-client 
privilege.”56  This argument relies on the fact that “[n]o rational 
defendant would disclose damning evidence” and therefore the 
attorney-client privilege plays an integral part in preserving that 
capacity.57 
B. Attorney-Client Privilege Promotes Public Policy Through 
Disclosure and Effective Legal Advice 
Among the purposes of the privilege is to “encourage clients to 
make full disclosure to their attorneys.”58  Confidential information 
obtained in the course of providing legal advice is protected.59  
Recognizing the public’s interest in achieving justice, the law seeks to 
safeguard the confidential nature of discussions between a lawyer and 
a client by “encourag[ing] full and frank communication.”60  The 
principle remains that “[u]ninhibited confidence in the inviolability of 
the relationship is . . . essential to the protection of a client’s legal 
rights, and to the proper functioning of the adversary process.”61  As a 
result, the attorney-client privilege serves to promote the “broader 
public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.”62 
 
 54. Levy, 577 F.2d at 209. 
 55. See Whitley, supra note 52, at 1536. 
 56. Michael Jay Hartman, Comment, Yes, Martha Stewart Can Even Teach Us 
About the Constitution: Why Constitutional Considerations Warrant an Extension of 
the Attorney-Client Privilege in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
867, 872 (2008). 
 57. Whitley, supra note 52, at 1536. 
 58. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 
 59. See id.  
 60. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) 
(“[T]he attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank 
communications between attorneys and their clients.  It thereby encourages 
observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice.”); Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 61. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
 62. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
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The party “seeking to invoke the privilege” has the burden of 
“establish[ing] all the essential elements.”63  Due to the privilege’s 
restrictive impact on the fact-finding process, the Court has asserted 
that evidentiary privileges should “not [be] lightly created nor 
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search of the 
truth.”64  Accordingly, courts have recognized the need to narrowly 
constrain the attorney-client privilege to a point that is consistent with 
its underlying purposes.65  This constraint is necessary to balance the 
judicial “tension” caused by an assertion of the privilege.66  It also 
serves to prevent abuse of the privilege.67 
C. As an Entity Privilege  
The government attorney-client privilege is an organizational 
privilege.68  Many commentators often analogize it to the privilege of 
a corporation.69  The privilege was extended in the corporate context 
as early as 1915.70  The Seventh Circuit reiterated that the privilege 
 
 63. United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United 
States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The burden is on the proponent 
of the attorney-client privilege to demonstrate its applicability.”). 
 64. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Damin, supra note 5, at 1015. 
 65. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990); Fisher v. United States, 
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 975 (5th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 66. John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-
Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 446 (1982) (noting that a “tension exists 
between the secrecy required to effectuate the privilege and the openness demanded 
by the factfinding process”). 
 67. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“The privilege takes flight if the 
relation is abused.”); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(noting that “the attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a 
sword”). 
 68. See Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1303.  
 69. Jeffrey L. Goodman & Jason Zabokrtsky, The Attorney-Client Privilege and 
the Municipal Lawyer, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 655, 664 (2000) (“Private corporations 
provide a setting somewhat analogous to the [government] setting because both 
involve the privilege as it relates to an organizational client.”). But see Melanie B. 
Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege the 
Privileged?, 77 IND. L.J. 469, 494 (2002) (“Even if corporations and government 
entities were structurally similar, the justification for extending the attorney-client 
privilege to government would rest on questionable foundations.”).  
 70. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (“The 
desirability of protecting confidential communications between attorney and client as 
a matter of public policy is too well known . . . to need extended comment now.  If 
such communications were required to be made the subject of examination and 
publication, such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon professional 
advice and assistance.”). 
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“in its broad sense” should be “available to corporation[s].”71  The 
ABA also addresses the concept of entity privilege in the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct.72  Courts have continued to apply the 
government attorney-client privilege through the “entity” lens, 
paralleling the corporate privilege.73  One commentator has asserted 
that for entities “nearly all the case law concerning the attorney-client 
privilege . . . involve[s] corporate clients.”74 
The unique nature of a corporation requires that it “must act 
through agents.”75  As a result, under the corporate privilege, entities 
hold the privilege, not specific individuals.76  This raises difficulties for 
application of the privilege as there are “often hundreds or even 
thousands of agents” in one corporation.77  Early cases dealing with 
the corporate privilege developed a variety of tests to determine who 
could claim the corporation’s privilege.78  One of the predominant 
tests employed was the control-group test.79 
The leading Supreme Court case involving a claim of corporate 
privilege, Upjohn Co. v. United States,80 involved “an internal 
investigation” by a corporation of “questionable payments” to a 
 
 71. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963) 
(holding that “based on history, principle, precedent and public policy the attorney-
client privilege in its broad sense is available to corporation[s]”).  
 72. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2012) (“A lawyer 
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through 
its duly authorized constituents.”). 
 73. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 621 (D.D.C. 1979); see 
also Lory A. Barsdate, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity, 
97 YALE L.J. 1725, 1734 (1988). 
 74. See Pincus, supra note 11, at 278. 
 75. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) 
(“[A] corporation must act through agents.  A corporation cannot speak directly to 
its lawyers.  Similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when disclosure is in its 
best interest.  Each of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by individuals 
empowered to act on behalf of the corporation.”); see also David Simon, The 
Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 956 (1956). 
 76. See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348; see also In re Richard Roe, Inc., 168 F.3d 69, 
72 (2d Cir. 1999).  
 77. See Sexton, supra note 66, at 449. 
 78. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 
1950) (holding that the privilege applied to any employee within the organization). 
 79. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. 
Pa. 1962) (“[I]f the employee making the communication . . . is in a position to 
control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the 
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney . . . then, in effect, he is (or 
personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the 
privilege would apply.”). 
 80. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
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foreign government.81  To determine the scope of the illegal action, 
Upjohn’s general counsel sent out a questionnaire asking for detailed 
information.82  The IRS subsequently requested this material and the 
corporation denied access, claiming attorney-client privilege.83  The 
lower court held the corporate context unique and limited the 
privilege to “senior management.”84 
The Supreme Court recognized the practical difficulties of applying 
the control-group test.85  Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the 
questionnaires provided to employees were necessary for the 
corporation to obtain legal advice.86  Each employee’s scope of 
responsibility impacted the investigation “concerning compliance 
with securities and tax laws, foreign laws.”87  The Court held that the 
employee communications were protected against disclosure and 
supported by the underlying principles of the attorney-client 
privilege.88 
D. Limitations on the Attorney Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege is not absolute.89  The exceptions that 
do exist are few because the privilege itself is inherently embedded 
with limitations.90  One way for the privilege to be pierced is through 
the client’s waiver of the privilege.91  Clients may impliedly waive the 
 
 81. Id. at 386. 
 82. See id. at 387.  
 83. See id. at 388. 
 84. Id. at 390 (citations omitted). 
 85. Id. at 393 (“[A]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but 
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at 
all.”). 
 86. See id. at 394.  
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at 395. 
 89. See Jason Greenberg, Comment, Swidler & Berlin v. United States. . . . And 
Justice for All?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 939, 946 (2000) (“Over the years, courts have carved 
out three main exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.”).  
 90. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5501 (“[There are] ‘well-
established’ exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.  These exceptions are few in 
number because, unlike the hearsay rule, most of the policy limitations on the 
privilege are embedded in the definition of the privilege.  It is, therefore, important 
that lawyers understand that in seeking access to allegedly privileged materials, the 
exceptions are a last resort.”). 
 91. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (“[I]f the client has voluntarily 
waived the privilege, it cannot be insisted on to close the mouth of the attorney.”); In 
re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (“As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege is waived by voluntary 
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privilege through their conduct or “consent to disclosure.”92  The 
privilege is also waived when a client “voluntarily discloses privileged 
information to a third party.”93  Testifying at trial is another method 
of waiving the privilege.94 
Many other limitations on the government attorney-client privilege 
originate in the need for open government.95  One such limitation is 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).96  Enacted in 1966, FOIA’s 
primary goal is to create “an open government accountable to the 
citizenry.”97  This allows any citizen to request information from the 
federal government unless it is specifically excluded under one of nine 
enumerated exceptions.98  Many courts find that exemption five—
stating that an agency is permitted to withhold “inter-agency or intra-
agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law 
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency”99—
encompasses the attorney-client privilege.100  As with the privilege in 
general, the burden rests on the agency when invoking the 
exemption.101 
 
disclosure of private communications by an individual or corporation to third 
parties.”). 
 92. United States v. Dakota, 197 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Von Bulow, 
828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 93. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d 
Cir. 1991); Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1198, 1207 (1982). 
 94. Mathew S. Miller, Note, The Costs of Waiver: Cost-Benefit Analysis as a New 
Basis for Selective Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1248, 
1254–55 (2008). 
 95. See generally Nancy Leong, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege in the Public 
Sector: A Survey of Government Attorneys, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 163, 189 
(2007). 
 96. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 97. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study 
in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 652 
(1984).  Wald argues that “[a]n excessive, and sometimes obsessive, passion for 
governmental secrecy can threaten a secure constitutional democracy.” Id. at 654. 
 98. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
 99. Id. § 552(b)(5). 
 100. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154 
(1975); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977). 
 101. Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 863.  
GLENN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:41 PM 
1462 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
E. Crime-Fraud Exception 
Another frequently invoked exception to the attorney-client 
privilege is the crime-fraud exception.102  According to the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, the crime-fraud 
exception applies when a client: 
(a) consults a lawyer for the purpose, later accomplished, of 
obtaining assistance to engage in a crime or fraud or aiding a third 
person to do so, or  
(b) regardless of the client’s purpose at the time of consultation, uses 
the lawyer’s advice or other services to engage in or assist a crime or 
fraud.103 
The purpose of the crime-fraud exception is to keep the attorney-
client privilege from “shielding from prosecution” a client who uses 
his attorney’s advice “to initiate or continue a fraudulent or criminal 
activity.”104  It functions to prevent abuses and “secur[e] the integrity 
of the trial process.”105  A myriad of options can give rise to the need 
for the crime-fraud exception.106  The fact that a client may be 
culpable or engaging in other criminal activity does not automatically 
invoke the exception.107  An attorney’s knowledge or awareness of his 
client’s intent does not matter for purposes of the exception.108  The 
client’s specific understanding of whether the act he is communicating 
about is criminal is also irrelevant.109  What does matter for the 
purposes of the exception is the “client’s intent at the time he sought 
 
 102. See Geraldine Gauthier, Note, Dangerous Liaisons: Attorney-Client 
Privilege, the Crime-Fraud Exception, ABA Model Rule 1.6 and Post-September 11 
Counter-Terrorist Measures, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 351 (2002). 
 103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000). 
 104. Rachel A. Hutzel, Note, Evidence: The Crime Fraud Exception to Attorney-
Client Privilege—United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (Interim Ed. 1989), 15 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 365, 372 (1990). 
 105. Colin Miller, The Purpose-Driven Rule: Drew Peterson, Giles v. California, 
and the Transferred Intent Doctrine of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. SIDEBAR 228, 235 (2012). 
 106. Hutzel, supra note 104, at 372 (listing conspiracy, “solicitation of illegal 
assistance,” and “performance of legal services without the attorney knowing of the 
client’s tortious or criminal purpose” as possible actions warranting the exception). 
 107. In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he crime-fraud 
exception does not apply simply because privileged communications would provide 
an adversary with evidence of a crime or fraud.”). 
 108. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 cmt. c (2000) 
(“The client need not specifically understand that the contemplated act is a crime or 
fraud.”). 
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the attorney’s advice.”110  One should not be able to obtain protection 
for communications that were received through bad faith.111 
The Court first addressed the crime-fraud exception in Clark v. 
United States.112  Clark involved the issue of a juror being charged 
with criminal contempt for providing misleading statements.113  The 
Court recognized a need for the privilege to be overcome in 
circumstances of that nature.114  Over fifty years later, the Court 
expanded its jurisprudence in this area in United States v. Zolin, a 
case involving an IRS investigation into L. Ron Hubbard, the Church 
of Scientology founder.115 
The Zolin Court created a two-part test for determining whether 
the crime-fraud exception applies.116  In doing so, the Court did not 
rule on “the quantum of proof necessary ultimately to establish . . . 
the crime-fraud exception.”117  It first ruled that in camera inspections 
of privileged materials could be an appropriate method of reviewing 
privileged materials.118  Before allowing the in camera inspection, the 
Court determined a threshold should be met.119  To properly invoke 
this exception, the moving party must establish a prima facie case.120  
 
 110. Auburn K. Daily & S. Britta Thornquist, Has the Exception Outgrown the 
Privilege?: Exploring the Application of the Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 585 (2003). 
 111. H. Lowell Brown, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client 
Privilege in the Context of Corporate Counseling, 87 KY. L.J. 1191, 1216–17 (1999). 
 112. 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“A client who consults an attorney for advice that will 
serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law.  He must let 
the truth be told.”). 
 113. Id. at 6. 
 114. Id. at 14 (“[T]he privilege does not apply where the relation giving birth to it 
has been fraudulently begun or fraudulently continued.”).  
 115. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989). 
 116. Id. at 572 (requiring first “a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a 
good faith belief by a reasonable person” that an in camera review of materials “may 
reveal evidence to establish the claim” and second, allowing for an “in camera review 
to determine the applicability of the crime-fraud exception”). 
 117. Id. at 563. 
 118. Id. at 565 (“We conclude that no express provision of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence bars . . . in camera review, and that it would be unwise to prohibit it in all 
instances as a matter of federal common law.”). 
 119. Id. at 570 (“In addressing this question, we attend to the detrimental effect, if 
any, of in camera review on the policies underlying the privilege and on the orderly 
administration of justice in our courts.  We conclude that some such showing must be 
made.”). 
 120. In re Int’l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(noting that a prima facie case has “[evidence] [s]uch as will suffice until contradicted 
and overcome by other evidence . . . [a] case which has proceeded upon sufficient 
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Professor Fried notes that courts recently have begun to favor a 
“lesser burden.”121  This may be in part due to the fact that courts 
struggle with determining what reaches this “required evidentiary 
level.”122  What is clear is that courts have repeatedly held conclusory 
allegations of fraud to be insufficient to invoke the crime-fraud 
exception.123 
II.  DISPUTE OVER WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD EXIST IN A FEDERAL GRAND JURY 
PROCEEDING  
Most courts agree that government attorneys can claim attorney-
client privilege in a civil context.124  Where the circuits split is whether 
that same privilege can be invoked when a government attorney is 
called before a grand jury.125  Cases arising out of the Eighth and D.C. 
Circuits during the Whitewater investigation rejected the extension of 
the privilege between confidential communications of the Office of 
the White House Counsel and the Office of the President.126  The 
Seventh Circuit, following the rationale of these two circuits, also 
denied the privilege in a case involving an investigation into a 
potential “licenses for bribes” scheme by the Illinois Secretary of 
State.127  The Second Circuit, however, broke from the ranks in 2005 
and upheld the government attorney-client privilege in the grand jury 
 
proof to that stage where it will support [a] finding if evidence to the contrary is 
disregarded” (citation omitted)). 
 121. David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-
Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 462 
(1986). 
 122. Christopher Paul Galanek, Note, The Impact of the Zolin Decision on the 
Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 24 GA. L. REV. 1115, 1125 
(1990). 
 123. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“It is obvious that it would be 
absurd to say that the privilege could be got rid of merely by making a charge of 
fraud.” (citations omitted)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 
1997) (finding it insufficient when the government “allege[s] that it has a sneaking 
suspicion the client was engaging in or intending to engage in a crime or fraud”). 
 124. Damin, supra note 5, at 1010. 
 125. See discussion infra Part II and accompanying notes. 
 126. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 127. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
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setting.128  Shortly thereafter, they again reiterated support for the 
government attorney-client privilege in In re County of Erie.129 
Courts recognize that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is 
to promote a broad public interest by encouraging client candor and 
increasing the frankness of communications between clients and their 
attorneys.130  Government entities are also seen as being “well-served 
by the privilege” in the civil context.131  In a criminal grand jury 
proceeding, however, courts and commentators have questioned the 
rationale for the privilege claimed by government officials and the 
entities they represent. 
Part II of this Note presents and analyzes the arguments for and 
against the recognition of the government attorney-client privilege in 
the federal grand jury context.  Part II.A provides the rationale of the 
courts and commentators that have declined to extend the 
government attorney-client privilege in that context. Part II.A.1 
presents the argument that the underlying rationale for the corporate 
privilege does not justify its application in the government context. 
Part II.A.2 analyzes the argument that creating an open and honest 
government is the paramount public interest that should be weighed. 
Part II.A.3 offers the viewpoint that client candor is not increased 
through an application of the attorney-client privilege.  Part II.A.4 
articulates the argument that other privileges provide adequate 
protection to confidential matters between a government attorney 
and his client. 
Part II.B presents an integrated analysis of the opposing rationales 
provided in support of extending the government attorney-client 
privilege in the federal grand jury context.  Part II.B.1 asserts that the 
corporate analogy is relevant to the consideration of a government 
attorney-client privilege.  Part II.B.2 articulates the argument that 
denying open discussions has a detrimental impact on society as a 
whole.  Part II.B.3 presents the position that full and frank 
communications are just as important in the public context as the 
private context.  Finally, Part II.B.4 argues that other recommended 
privileges are insufficient to guard the confidential information 
protected via the attorney-client privilege. 
A. Declining to Extend the Government Attorney-Client 
 
 128. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 129. 473 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 130. See Blumenauer, supra note 15, at 93. 
 131. Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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Privilege in the Federal Grand Jury Context 
Two prominent cases arose during the Clinton Whitewater scandal 
that laid the foundation for the rationale that the government 
attorney-client privilege should not extend in matters before a federal 
grand jury.  The Seventh Circuit followed this rationale in denying the 
privilege in a case involving a state official in a “licenses for bribes 
scandal.”132  The reasoning that each court followed is presented in 
chronological order as a framework to highlight how the concept of 
the privilege evolved between the three cases. 
1. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 
In 1996, while serving as Independent Counsel during the 
Whitewater investigation, Kenneth Starr served a grand jury 
subpoena upon the White House requiring the production of 
documents created in meetings that “pertain[ed] to several 
Whitewater-related subjects.”133  The White House failed to produce 
the requested documents asserting the materials were protected by 
the attorney-client privilege in addition to other privileges.134  The 
Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC) then moved to compel 
disclosure of two previously requested sets of documents.135 
The first set of notes in question involved a meeting on July 11, 
1995, between Mrs. Clinton, Jane Sherburne (Special Counsel to the 
President), and Mrs. Clinton’s private attorney, David Kendall.136  
The subject matter of this meeting was Mrs. Clinton’s activities 
following the untimely death of Vincent Foster.137  The second set of 
notes was taken at various meetings on January 26, 1996 between 
Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Kendall, Ms. Seligman, and John Quinn (Counsel 
to the President).138  These meetings involved the topic of the 
discovery of billing records from the Rose Law Firm in the White 
House residency.139  Judge Wright held that the attorney-client 
 
 132. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d at 289. 
 133. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1997).  
In his role as Independent Counsel, Kenneth Starr was assigned to investigate the 
Whitewater matter and to pursue evidence of any related crimes involving President 
and Mrs. Clinton’s relationship to certain banking and investing organizations. Id. 
 134. Id. at 913–14.  The White House did note the existence of nine sets of 
documents that were responsive to the subpoena request. Id. at 913. 
 135. Id. at 914. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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privilege applied because “Mrs. Clinton and the White House had a 
‘genuine and reasonable (whether or not mistaken)’ belief that the 
conversations at issue were privileged.”140  The OIC appealed this 
decision and the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded.141 
The Eighth Circuit began its explanation by acknowledging the 
need to “apply the federal common law of attorney-client privilege to 
the situation presented by this case.”142  Using Proposed Federal Rule 
of Evidence 503 as “a useful starting place,” the Eighth Circuit noted 
that the rule and other commentary would only serve the “broad 
proposition” that a governmental body may be a client.143  Noting a 
lack of case law supporting the White House’s position that the 
privilege exists in the criminal context, the Eighth Circuit then looked 
to general principles regarding privileges.144  Noting that privileges are 
exceptions,145 rather than standards, the court then focused on the 
main underlying principles that lie at the heart of the case.146 
The Eighth Circuit recognized that organizations had privileges in 
criminal cases, but noted there are “important differences” between 
governments and corporations and therefore rejected the argument 
offered by the White House based on the Upjohn rationale.147  The 
court noted in particular that the White House could not be subject to 
criminal liability.148  The court also found significant the existence of a 
statutory reporting requirement for executive officials regarding 
criminal wrongdoing.149  Central to the opinion was the idea that the 
 
 140. Id. (citations omitted). 
 141. Id. at 925–26. 
 142. Id. at 915. 
 143. Id. at 915–16.  The Eighth Circuit also conducted an analysis of the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers and the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence regarding the specific issue at hand. Id. at 916.  The court noted the 
Restatement provided instructive language regarding the complexities of the exercise 
of the attorney-client privilege in intra-governmental conflicts, but looked to case law 
to refine the principles. Id. 
 144. Id. at 918. 
 145. Id. (“Federal common law recognizes a privilege only in rare situations.”).  
Among the exceptions the court cited to: psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
corporation attorney-client privilege, and qualified executive privilege. Id. 
 146. See id. at 919. 
 147. Id. at 920. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  The statute in question is 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2006).  The relevant portion 
states: “[a]ny information . . . received in a department or agency of the executive 
branch of the Government relating to violations of Federal criminal law involving 
Government officers and employees shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney 
General.” Id. 
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weight of the public interest is greater than the need for 
confidentiality for the government attorney.150  The court ultimately 
held that “the White House may not use the attorney-client privilege” 
to avoid producing the documents the OIC requested under 
subpoena.151 
2. In re Lindsey 
The prosecutorial jurisdiction for the OIC was expanded in 1998 to 
consider matters beyond the financial issues surrounding Whitewater, 
namely possibly perjured testimony in the lawsuit by Paula Jones 
against President Clinton.152  The grand jury issued a subpoena for 
Bruce Lindsey, Deputy White House Counsel and the President’s 
personal attorney, to testify regarding any information he may have 
related to the perjury claims surrounding the Jones lawsuit.153  In 
three appearances before the grand jury, Lindsey invoked the 
attorney-client privilege and failed to address the questions presented 
to him.154  Chief Judge Johnson, on a motion by the OIC, compelled 
disclosure of the requested documents.155  The President appealed the 
decision, and the case proceeded to the D.C. Circuit.156 
The D.C. Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, recognized that a 
government attorney-client privilege exists for public requests for 
information, and is guided by recognized common law principles.157  
 
 150. Id. at 921 (“We believe the strong public interest in honest government and in 
exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-served by recognition of a 
governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring 
into the actions of public officials.”). 
 151. Id. at 924. 
 152. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1266–67 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating the order 
expanding jurisdiction authorized investigation into “whether Monica Lewinsky or 
others suborned perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise 
violated federal law”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  Lindsey also claimed executive privilege, personal attorney-client 
privilege and work product privilege. Id.  This Note focuses only on the government 
attorney-client privilege, though the other claimed privileges do raise interesting 
constitutional and ethical concerns as well. 
 155. Id. (“[T]he privilege is qualified in the grand jury context and may be 
overcome upon a sufficient showing of need for the subpoenaed communications and 
unavailability from other sources.”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. at 1268–69.  The court provides as examples cases involving the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the use of exemption five. Id. at 1268.  
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit looked to Proposed Rule 503 as evidence of the 
federal common law. Id. at 1269. 
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In addition, the court noted in practice that government attorneys 
evinced a “common understanding” of the privilege’s function in 
litigation involving FOIA requests and individual suits against 
government officials.158  The court noted, however, that the claimed 
privilege applied only to legal advice provided.159  Finding at least one 
occasion of legal advice, the D.C. Circuit attempted to decide 
“whether the government attorney-client privilege could be invoked 
in these circumstances.”160 
The court first rejected the line of cases arising out of the FOIA 
exemption as “not necessarily control[ling] the application of the 
privilege.”161  The court’s analysis focused on the competing 
considerations presented when two government entities face each 
other in litigation.162  The court reasoned that the complex structure, 
tradition, and function of government operations should be 
considered when deciding upon an “expansion of the privilege to all 
governmental entities” across all types of litigation.163 
The main policy argument presented again revolved around the 
public interest in disclosure.164  The court asserted that public trust 
“strongly militates” against allowing the privilege to exist in a 
criminal investigation of government wrongdoing.165  Invoking 
Madisonian principles, the D.C. Circuit argued that “transparent and 
accountable government” protects the public trust.166  Citing to 
Robert Bork, among others, the court also strongly suggested the 
government counsel’s role in reporting wrongdoing is instrumental in 
 
 158. Id.  The court cited to letters provided by Theodore Olson and Antonin Scalia 
in their former official capacities as Assistant Attorney Generals in the Office of the 
Legal Counsel (OLC). Id. 
 159. Id. at 1270 (“Thus, Lindsey’s advice on political, strategic, or policy issues . . . 
would not be shielded from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.”). 
 160. Id. at 1271. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 1271–72. 
 163. Id. at 1272. 
 164. See id. at 1273 (“Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a government 
lawyer therefore cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1273–74 (“A popular Government, without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. 
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own 
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” (quoting 
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910))). 
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protecting the public trust.167  While the court noted that limiting the 
privilege in the grand jury context may “chill some communications” 
between the client and advocate, it found this to be an acceptable 
course of action.168  The court ultimately held that government 
attorneys could not invoke the attorney-client privilege in the same 
manner as private counsel, especially in the grand jury context, due to 
significant public interest concerns.169 
3. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 
The issue of attorney-client privilege in the context of a federal 
criminal investigation was expanded beyond federal executive 
officials in a case before the Seventh Circuit.170  The federal 
government during “Operation Safe Road” was investigating the 
Illinois Secretary of State’s Office for an alleged “licenses for bribes” 
scheme.171  The federal government sought the cooperation of Roger 
Bickel, who had been serving as the Secretary of State’s legal 
counsel.172  However, the former Secretary (and later Governor), 
George Ryan, informed Bickel that he had not waived the attorney-
client privilege regarding any of his prior conversations with Bickel.173  
After serving a subpoena for Bickel to appear before the grand jury, 
the government moved to compel him to testify.174  Chief Judge 
Aspen granted the motion and Ryan appealed.175 
The Seventh Circuit held that the client for whom the privilege 
applies is the State of Illinois.176  This presented a unique challenge to 
the court in addressing the issue of whether the privilege differs 
 
 167. Id. at 1275.  While serving as Solicitor General during the Nixon 
Administration, Bork, when offered a position on the President’s legal team, stated: 
“A government attorney is sworn to uphold the Constitution.  If I come across 
evidence that is bad for the President, I’ll have to turn it over.  I won’t be able to sit 
on it like a private defense attorney.” A Conversation with Robert H. Bork, 1998 
D.C. BAR REP. 9.  
 168. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1276. 
 169. Id. at 1278. 
 170. See In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000–2, 288 F.3d 289, 290 
(7th Cir. 2002). 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 290–91. 
 175. Id. at 291. 
 176. Id. 
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between civil and criminal contexts.177  The Seventh Circuit asserted 
that “government lawyers have a higher, competing duty to act in the 
public interest.”178  The court also noted that government lawyers are 
funded by the public and this would be a “misuse of public assets” to 
allow the privilege in a criminal investigation.179  The court reasoned 
that because the privilege extends to the office, and not an individual, 
to offer it as an incentive for compliance is unnecessary.180  The court 
asserted that the public interest and “lack of criminal liability for 
government agencies” balanced against any potential need for the 
privilege.181 
4. Categorical Arguments Against Extending the Government 
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Federal Grand Jury Context 
a. Corporate Privilege Rationale Does Not Extend to the 
Government Context 
Professor Melanie B. Leslie argues that the premise that a 
government entity is similar to a corporate entity is based upon a 
“shaky foundation.”182  Other scholars have argued that justifying a 
privilege to government organizations is “even more fallacious” when 
compared to a corporate entity privilege.183  The Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that there exist “important differences between the 
government and nongovernmental organizations” which caution 
“against the application of the principles of Upjohn.”184 
Professor Leslie asserts through an analysis of pre-conduct and 
post-conduct legal advice the instrumental distinctions that mar the 
comparison between corporate and government entities.185  One such 
distinction that can be drawn is that government officials serve in 
 
 177. See id. at 291–92 (discussing other courts and leading treatises treatment of 
the privilege regarding private parties in a criminal context and how the government 
attorneys privilege is viewed differently). 
 178. Id. at 293. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 294. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Leslie, supra note 69, at 472–73.  
 183. James A. Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of Corporate 
Clients—Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299, 309, 379 (1963).  
 184. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 185. See Leslie, supra note 69, at 498–511 (discussing the differences between 
corporate entities and government entities in the rationale for seeking pre-conduct 
and post-conduct legal advice). 
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positions of public trust.186  This position of trust weighs against using 
a corporate based rationale for government officials as they are not 
driven by the same “profit motives of corporations.”187  The 
government’s obligation to serve the public interest in litigation 
serves as a key distinction between government and private lawyers.188  
Further, government officials possess “little incentive to push official 
conduct to or past the law’s boundaries.”189  Rather, because 
government officials serve in a public capacity, they should “favor 
disclosure over concealment.”190  The Eighth Circuit found this 
difference to be “perhaps, by itself, reason enough to find [the 
corporate analogy] unpersuasive in this case.”191 
According to the Eighth Circuit, another key difference is that 
government entities cannot be subject to criminal penalties like those 
a corporation could possibly face.192  A corporation has a distinct 
interest in discovering employee misconduct in order to protect 
itself.193  On the contrary, government entities have a statutory 
responsibility to report employee misconduct.194  In fact, the 
“investigation and punishment of wrongdoing” by government 
officials is a central “function[] of the executive branch of 
government.”195  The existence and survival of a government entity 
does not rest upon their pursuit of “competitive success” by 
eliminating wrongdoing.196  Due to mandatory reporting 
requirements, there is no justification for using the “attorney-client 
privilege as an incentive to increase compliance with the laws.”197 
 
 186. Id. at 496. 
 187. See Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1740–41. 
 188. Id. at 1738. 
 189. Leslie, supra note 69, at 498–99. 
 190. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. (“A corporation, in contrast, may be subject to both civil and criminal 
liability for the actions of its agents, and corporate attorneys therefore have a 
compelling interest in ferreting out any misconduct by employees.”). 
 193. Leslie, supra note 69, at 521–22. 
 194. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920. 
 195. Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific Obligations that Follow from 
Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty to Serve the Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 13, 34 (2003).  
 196. Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1741. 
 197. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 293–94 
(7th Cir. 2002). 
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b. Open and Honest Government Is the Paramount Public Interest 
Another argument against the government attorney-client privilege 
is that “[p]rivileges are in direct conflict with open government.”198  
The government possesses a unique responsibility to provide 
information to the public “concerning government operations.”199  If 
the people are not aware of what the government is doing, “then this 
premise is little more than an empty promise.”200  Maintaining an 
open government is often recognized as being “crucial to ensuring 
that the people remain in control.”201  This has been a central tenet of 
our government since the beginning of the democracy.202  Courts have 
recognized allowing government secrecy will cause “[d]emocracies 
[to] die behind closed doors.”203 
Supporting this idea, Professor Moliterno argues that the 
government has taken steps to avoid a secretive government.204  
Among the significant steps taken is the passage of federal open 
government laws like FOIA.205  These laws help to “ensure an 
informed citizenry” and assist in “check[ing] against corruption.”206  
These laws do not make all government-related information available 
to the public, however, and thus have a limited reach.207 
c. Client Candor Is Not Increased Through Preservation of the 
Privilege 
Further distinguishing the government privilege is the rationale 
that the “disincentives to candor” do not apply to government 
employees.208  This argument centers on the government’s claim of 
 
 198. See Gowdy, supra note 22, at 720. 
 199. See Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1735. 
 200. See Clark, supra note 3, at 1047.  
 201. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 202. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (“In the ultimate, an 
informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.”). 
 203. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).  
 204. See Moliterno, supra note 10, at 636 (“The government has expressed this 
preference by enacting statutes that either command or encourage revelation of 
government wrongdoing.”). 
 205. Clark, supra note 3, at 1046 (listing FOIA, the Privacy Act of 1974, 
Government in the Sunshine Act, Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978 as examples of open government statutes).  
 206. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 
(1978). 
 207. Mika C. Morse, Note, Honor or Betrayal? The Ethics of Government 
Lawyer-Whistleblowers, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421, 435 (2010). 
 208. See Leslie, supra note 69, at 499. 
GLENN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:41 PM 
1474 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
privilege involving materials that are not confidential, which would 
“serve[] no compelling purpose.”209  In the post-conduct context, 
Leslie argues that the government structure impacts an employee’s 
desire to even claim the privilege.210  Leslie finds it more likely, during 
litigation, that the government entity would waive the privilege, thus 
reducing an employee’s reliance on it.211  Berenson expands on this 
idea by arguing that “the government attorney’s responsibility to 
serve the public interest” is clarified in areas traditionally litigated by 
the government attorney.212  This requires the government attorney to 
“determine whether the public official is acting in accord with the 
law” and only represent those individuals.213 
Another commentator, Bryan Gowdy, argues that the idea of 
encouraging client candor is “too speculative” in the government 
context.214  This relationship fails because the government employee’s 
communications with government attorneys often “do not contain 
confidential facts about the agency.”215  Noting the distinctive 
interests served by corporate and government attorneys, it is argued 
that government officials possess “a constitutional duty to faithfully 
execute the laws.”216  They have a duty to “seek a fair result beyond 
. . . the interests of the government client.”217  This has the effect of 
forcing the “government lawyer to yield[] to the moral force pressing 
for revelation.”218 As a result, the privilege is rendered unnecessary 
for the government official who has uncertainty about the applicable 
law.219 
Leslie supports the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning by arguing that “a 
broad government attorney-client privilege is not justified.”220  Leslie 
instead argues for a “level[ing] of the playing field” as the limited 
justification for the government attorney-client privilege.221  This 
 
 209. Id.  
 210. See id. at 506 (“The government employee in serious trouble is unlikely to 
talk to government counsel, privilege or no privilege, because she knows that if she 
does, her superiors will shortly learn the truth.”). 
 211. See id. at 507. 
 212. See Berenson, supra note 30, at 801. 
 213. Josephson & Pearce, supra note 4, at 556.  
 214. See Gowdy, supra note 22, at 718. 
 215. See Leslie, supra note 69, at 499. 
 216. See Gowdy, supra note 22, at 719. 
 217. See Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1738. 
 218. See Moliterno, supra note 10, at 635. 
 219. See Gowdy, supra note 22, at 719–20. 
 220. Leslie, supra note 69, at 526. 
 221. Id. at 527. 
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justification, however, would only be allowed in cases of trial 
preparation.222  Ultimately, Leslie argues that the underlying 
assumptions of the government attorney-client privilege are a 
“fiction.”223  Instead, she contends that by limiting the privilege it 
“would make government entities more accountable to the citizens 
they serve.”224 
d. Other Privileges Can Provide Sufficient Protection to 
Confidential Materials 
Gowdy does recognize the government’s need for secrecy in some 
respects, but argues there are more appropriate tools than the 
attorney-client privilege to protect that need.225  The work-product 
doctrine is suggested as one way to protect the “government party’s 
strategic interests in litigation.”226  This protection stems from the 
needs of the attorney to adequately prepare a client’s case without 
“undue and needless interference.”227  The work product doctrine 
drastically reduces an opponent’s access to materials “prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial.”228  Information may fall under 
both the work-product and attorney-client privileges, creating overlap 
in protection of the information.229  Failure to protect this information 
would run afoul of strong public policy considerations.230  Moliterno 
also recognizes certain “discrete areas of protection” but otherwise 
suggests, in cases of wrongdoing, a “government lawyer should reveal 
information about a client that a private lawyer would protect.”231 
Professor Leslie suggests that “top government officials” may be 
encouraged to openly communicate with their counsel as a result of 
the attorney-client privilege, but the executive privilege adequately 
 
 222. Id. at 528 (“The need to provide a level playing field in litigation also justifies 
extending work-product-like protection to oral statements made by government 
employees . . . in preparation of litigation.”). 
 223. Id. at 550. 
 224. Id.  
 225. Gowdy, supra note 22, at 720 (“Government lawyers need confidentiality 
when preparing strategies for upcoming litigation. The work product privilege serves 
this need by protecting an attorney’s mental impressions.”). 
 226. Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1743. 
 227. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
 228. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)).   
 229. See Salkin & Phillips, supra note 13, at 604. 
 230. See id. at 605. 
 231. See Moliterno, supra note 10, at 642. 
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protects the government’s need for confidentiality.232  She argues this 
is the “best mechanism” to adequately “balance the need for 
confidentiality with the public welfare.”233  Barsdate suggests that 
information should not be disclosed under these circumstances due to 
the possible “danger to the public interest.”234  The D.C. Circuit 
asserts that given the circumstances surrounding claims of executive 
privilege, “the need for secrecy” is arguably greater than for claims 
under other forms of privilege.235  It is cautioned, however, that the 
executive privilege is meant only serve to protect “frank debate 
between [the] President and advisers.”236 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the executive privilege may also 
apply differently in criminal and civil contexts.237  The Nixon court 
gave rise to the concept of a qualified executive privilege when it 
reasoned that allowing a claim of executive privilege “would cut 
deeply into the guarantee of due process of law” and further “gravely 
impair the basic function of the courts.”238  As a result, the Nixon 
court held that “privilege must yield” to the specific need for 
evidence in a criminal trial.239 
B. Extending the Government Attorney-Client Privilege in the 
Federal Grand Jury Context 
In 2005, the Second Circuit split from the other circuits in allowing 
the assertion of the government attorney-client privilege in a grand 
jury proceeding for subpoenaed documents and communications.  
Utilizing a rationale similar to that of the other circuit courts, the 
Second Circuit instead came out on the side of preserving the 
privilege in this context.  Following up shortly on this reasoning, the 
Second Circuit held in 2007 that the government attorney-client 
 
 232. See Leslie, supra note 69, at 496. 
 233. Id. at 473. 
 234. Barsdate, supra note 73, at 1744. 
 235. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  However, the D.C. 
Circuit did not get a chance to address the claim of executive privilege, as that issue 
was not on appeal before the court. 
 236. Dickmann, supra note 20, at 296 (citing In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1285 (Tatel, 
J., dissenting)). 
 237. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 917–18 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
 238. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974). 
 239. Id. at 713. 
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privilege could apply “[a]t least in civil litigation between a 
government agency and private litigants.”240 
1. In re Grand Jury 
The Second Circuit countered the growing restriction of the 
government attorney-client privilege in 2005 when Anne George, 
former Chief Legal Counsel to the Office of the Governor of 
Connecticut was called to testify before a federal grand jury.241  The 
investigation there involved questions over whether then-Governor 
Rowland had received gifts for “favorable negotiation and awarding 
of state contracts.”242  The government moved to compel George’s 
testimony, and the district court withheld decision pending her 
appearance before the grand jury.243  Once she appeared, the district 
court ordered George to testify.244  This decision was appealed by 
then-Governor Rowland and the Office of the Governor.245 
The court began its analysis by framing the issue in terms of 
whether the Office of the Governor could claim the privilege under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.246  The court noted that the principle 
of the privilege is “well-established” despite the limited application of 
case law to the specific circumstances before it.247  Although historical 
determinations of the purpose and scope of the privilege have 
waivered, the court asserted that the fundamental underpinnings 
remain consistent.248  The Second Circuit agreed with the other 
circuits that promotion of the public interest is an integral factor in 
considering the applicability of the privilege.249  The court 
 
 240. In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 241. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 242. Id. at 528–29. 
 243. See id. at 529. 
 244. See id. at 530 (noting that it was “undisputed that the grand jury need[ed] the 
information it [sought] to obtain from Ms. George,” the district court concluded that 
“[r]eason and experience dictate that, in the grand jury context, any governmental 
attorney-client privilege must yield because the interests served by the grand jury’s 
fact-finding process clearly outweigh the interest served by the privilege”). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. (“Our determination of whether the Office of the Governor may claim a 
privilege, then, requires us to ascertain ‘the principles of the common law’ and to 
apply them ‘in the light of reason and experience.’  In doing so . . . Rule 501 plainly 
requires that we apply the federal law of privilege.”). 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. at 531. 
 249. See id. (“Nevertheless, courts have by reason and experience concluded that a 
consistent application of the privilege over time is necessary to promote the rule of 
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distinguished its opinion by arguing that the public interest is not as 
clear as other courts contend.250 
The court rejected the idea that the privilege should be weaker in 
the government context.251  While recognizing an inherent difference 
between public and private lawyers, the Second Circuit found no 
reason to “jettison [the] principle” supporting the attorney-client 
privilege.252  The court also found the argument that government 
lawyers could consult private counsel in criminal matters insufficient 
to weaken the privilege.253  Rather than creating a balancing test, the 
court recognized the traditional doctrines that seek to limit 
“egregious abuses” of the privilege.254  The court found the 
Government’s arguments over the functionality of the privilege in the 
grand jury context to be “illusory” and “potentially dangerous.”255  In 
reversing the district court, the Second Circuit did not “extend” the 
privilege, but rather argued against its abrogation in the government 
context.256 
2. In re County of Erie 
The Second Circuit re-visited the government attorney-client 
privilege in a 2007 case involving a § 1983 claim against 
unconstitutional strip searches in the Erie County Correctional 
Facility.257  The exertion of the privilege revolved around e-mail 
documents concerning the policy and legal ramifications of the 
program of strip searches.258  While the central focus of the case 
concerned the content of the “privileged” documents, the court re-
asserted the necessity for a government lawyer attorney-client 
privilege.259  Noting that the privilege “accommodates competing 
 
law by encouraging consultation with lawyers, and ensuring that lawyers, once 
consulted, are able to render to their clients fully informed legal advice.”). 
 250. See id. at 534 (“One could as easily conclude . . . that the protections afforded 
by the privilege ultimately promote the public interest, even when they might impede 
the search for truth in a particular criminal investigation.”). 
 251. See id. (“We believe that, if anything, the traditional rationale for the 
privilege applies with special force in the government context.”). 
 252. Id. at 535.  
 253. See id. 
 254. Id. (noting that the “crime-fraud exception” is one such traditional limitation). 
 255. Id. at 536. 
 256. Id. (“[W]e have simply refused to countenance its abrogation in circumstances 
to which its venerable and worthy purposes fully pertain.”). 
 257. See In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 415–16 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 258. See id. at 416.  
 259. Id. at 416–22. 
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values,” the Second Circuit reasoned this accommodation is 
“sharpened” in the government lawyer context.260  According to the 
court, legal advice given to government officials who formulate policy 
is fundamental to “promot[ing] broader public interests.”261 
3. Categorical Arguments for Government Attorney-Client 
Privilege in Federal Grand Jury Context 
Courts and commentators offer varying justifications for support of 
the government attorney-client privilege generally, as well as in the 
narrow context of a federal grand jury.  One such justification for the 
government attorney-client privilege can be found in the leading 
treatise on federal practice and procedure.262  The rationale for the 
privilege there is: 
1) Other governmental privileges do not deal with the unique 
requirements of attorney confidentiality; 2) the court’s ability to 
apply the privilege to private parties may be a better source of 
regulation than expanding other government privileges; 3) denying 
elected officials open discussions about pending litigation with 
counsel would be detrimental to society as a whole; 4) full and frank 
disclosure is just as important in the public context as it is in the 
private context; 5) without the privilege, government may be 
required to fight with one hand behind its back; and 6) when a 
municipality has its own staff of lawyers, courts may analogize the 
privilege as applied to in-house corporate counsel.263 
Supporters of the government attorney-client privilege in the grand 
jury context rely upon several of these principles when invoking their 
arguments.  This section will focus upon four predominant rationales 
upon which courts and commentators consistently rely.  They are 
presented in order of how they are addressed by the opposition 
against the assertion of a government attorney-client privilege for the 
sake of continuity. 
 
 260. Id. at 418–19 (“On the one hand, non-disclosure impinges on open and 
accessible government.  On the other hand, public officials are duty-bound to 
understand and respect constitutional, judicial and statutory limitations on their 
authority; thus, their access to candid legal advice directly and significantly serves the 
public interest.” (citations omitted)). 
 261. Id. at 419. 
 262. See Salkin, supra note 33, at 288. 
 263. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, at 127–28. 
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a. Corporate Analogy Is Relevant to a Consideration of the 
Government Attorney-Client Privilege 
Because the government attorney-client privilege is an 
organizational privilege, it is argued that an understanding of the 
privilege in the corporate context is relevant.264  The drafters of the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers suggest that the 
rationale and objectives of the organizational attorney-client privilege 
“apply in general to governmental clients.”265  Supporters of applying 
the Upjohn entity privilege to the government note that the case did 
not center on the fact that a corporation could not be prosecuted for a 
crime.266  Rather, they focus on the need for government officials to 
receive sound legal advice, similar to that of officials in positions of 
responsibility for corporations.267  Scholars contend that the attorney-
client privilege “is intended to encourage employees and officials to 
disclose the truth” so that their organizations and entities are in 
“compliance with the law.”268  As Professor Rice argues, for any 
justification of the privilege in the corporate context, “the need within 
the government is equal, if not greater.”269 
Another aspect of Upjohn pointed to by supporters is its 
consistency with supporting the public interest.270  Allowing a 
corporation to use the privilege provides corporate counsel an 
opportunity to make significant efforts to provide legal advice in 
areas that are “hardly . . . instinctive.”271  Judge Tatel found protecting 
legal advice essential in his dissenting opinion arguing for the 
preservation of the attorney-client privilege for President Clinton.272  
 
 264. See Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1303. 
 265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 cmt. b 
(2000). 
 266. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 931 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(Kopf, J., dissenting). 
 267. See Stacy Lynn Newman, Comment, The Governmental Attorney-Client 
Privilege: Whether the Right to Evidence in A State Grand Jury Investigation Pierces 
the Privilege in New York State, 70 ALB. L. REV. 741, 756–57 (2007). 
 268. Id. at 757. 
 269. 1 PAUL R. RICE, JOHN BERNARD, & DAVID DRYSDALE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:28 (2d ed. 1999). 
 270. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1710. 
 271. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981). 
 272. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he unique protection the law affords a President’s communications with White 
House counsel rests . . . on the special nature of legal advice, and its special need for 
confidentiality, as recognized by centuries of common law.”). 
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To provide sufficient legal advice a steady line of communication 
between government officials and their lawyers is necessary.273 
b. Denying Elected Officials Open Discussions About Pending 
Litigation with Counsel Would Be Detrimental to Society as a Whole 
The second justification offered is that recognizing “the privilege in 
the grand jury context is consistent with the public interest.”274  
Building upon the reasoning of Upjohn, the argument states that a 
client’s capacity to modify their behavior in accordance with the law 
clearly supports the public interest.275  One commentator argues 
“[t]here is no reason why this logic does not apply to government 
organizations.”276  Applying it there becomes even easier, as the 
government employee has a duty to comply with the law.277  This is 
further compounded by acknowledging that the “[p]ublic sentiment 
that calls for corporate accountability resonates with the public trust” 
required of government officials.278 
Seeking “legal advice early on” also promotes efficient 
administration of the government by preventing bad policies from 
being implemented.279  The government lawyer’s role at this stage to 
“ascertain[] the factual background and sift[] through the facts with 
an eye to the legally relevant.”280  Further, scholars argue this impacts 
the capacity of a lawyer to provide zealous representation to the 
client.281  Charles Ruff, former White House Counsel, argued for a 
recognition of the privilege even in the aftermath of In re Lindsey.282 
 
 273. See Blumenauer, supra note 15, at 83.  
 274. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1710. 
 275. Id. at 1710–11. 
 276. See Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1330. 
 277. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1711; see also Clark, supra note 3, at 1072.  
 278. Salkin, supra note 33, at 287. 
 279. See Salkin & Phillips, supra note 13, at 585–86. 
 280. See Paulsen, supra note 22, at 497 (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 499 U.S. 
383, 390–91 (1981)). 
 281. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the 
Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 
986 (1991). 
 282. Stephen Labaton, Testing of a President: The Supreme Court; Administration 
Loses Two Legal Battles Against Starr, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at A19. 
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c. Full and Frank Disclosure Is Just as Important in the Public 
Context as It Is in the Private Context 
It is often asserted that the attorney-client privilege “encourage[s] 
full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients” 
by rendering certain communications confidential.283  One student 
commentator suggests a focus on this need to “encourage[] open and 
honest discussion between lawyer and client.”284  This would allow the 
client to know the full scope of the “testimonial privilege” before 
divulging otherwise privileged information.285  This may be even more 
relevant when the client potentially faces adverse action in the scope 
of a criminal investigation.286  Denying them the fundamental 
privilege would weaken the efforts for open and honest government 
as officials would be reluctant “come forward without the protection 
of the attorney-client privilege.”287 
Judge Tatel, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the need for “full 
and frank communication” allows a government attorney the 
opportunity to provide “reliable legal advice.”288  In his view, the 
majority opinion against the government attorney-client privilege will 
serve to “chill communications” between officials and their 
government lawyers.289  This would have the impact of putting the 
government at a disadvantage in litigation.290  Further, contrary to the 
public interest, it would force government officials to seek private 
counsel in order to avoid disclosure.291  Thus, even though it can 
potentially block “the factfinder’s access to potentially relevant 
evidence,” the privilege can “enhance[] the quality of representation 
and promote[] accurate truth-finding by providing attorneys with 
more information.”292 
 
 283. Daily & Thornquist, supra note 110, at 585 (quoting United States v. Zolin, 
491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989)). 
 284. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1709. 
 285. Id. at 1710. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Toporek, supra note 29, at 2428. 
 288. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 289. Id. (“[B]y the rule the court adopts today, the chilling effect is precisely the 
same.  Clients . . . will avoid confiding in their lawyers because they can never know 
whether the information they share, no matter how innocent, might some day 
become pertinent to possible criminal violations.” (citations omitted)). 
 290. Damin, supra note 5, at 1034. 
 291. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 931 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(Kopf, J., dissenting) (arguing that suggesting an official should seek private counsel 
“misses the point for extending the privilege to organizations”). 
 292. See Greenberg, supra note 89, at 945.  
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d. Other Privileges Do Not Deal with the Unique Requirements of 
Attorney Confidentiality 
Another justification supporting the privilege is the client’s need to 
determine whether the actions he took will give rise to adverse 
litigation either in a criminal or civil forum.293  This focus on the 
procedural aspect of seeking advice is not always necessarily rooted in 
an attempt to avoid disclosure.294  For those seeking to obtain advice 
to shield them from clear violations of the law, it is argued that the 
privilege should not be allowed.295  This prohibition would apply 
whether the advice was being obtained for civil or criminal matters.296  
Some argue that those who are uncertain of whether their actions are 
criminal should receive the privilege’s protection.297 
This process would allow for the client to know whether his actions 
might result in some form of culpability.298  Supporters of this 
principle argue that forcing the client to seek the advice of private 
counsel would “significantly reduce the effectiveness” in seeking the 
assistance of government counsel.299  It could result in the client 
seeking private counsel arbitrarily and keeping information from the 
public, thus undermining the public interest.300  There are adequate 
mechanisms in place, including the crime-fraud exception, to address 
any potential wrongdoing.301  Scholars argue that the crime-fraud 
exception “is an effective check on any potential abuse of the 
attorney-client privilege.”302  It would help to prevent government 
lawyers from using “taxpayer’s money” to protect a government 
official from attempts at “perpetrating criminal activity and fraud.”303  
The client of a government attorney has a reduced “legitimate 
expectation that its lawyers will remain silent” under these 
 
 293. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1711–12. 
 294. Id. at 1712. 
 295. Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1326. 
 296. Salkin & Phillips, supra note 13, at 584 (“[T]he Supreme Court has explicitly 
rejected the notion that the attorney-client privilege should be applied differently in 
different situations.”). 
 297. See Damin, supra note 5, at 1039. 
 298. Chud, supra note 21, at 1712. 
 299. Id. 
 300. See Damin, supra note 5, at 1035; see also Dickmann, supra note 20, at 308. 
 301. See Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1327. 
 302. See Salkin & Phillips, supra note 13, at 588; see also Lance Cole, Revoking 
Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-
Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 507 (2003). 
 303. See Damin, supra note 5, at 1042. 
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circumstances.304  Preventing fraudulent use of government resources 
suffices to protect the public interest.305 
III.  RESOLVING THE UNCLEAR STANDARD FOR THE 
GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CRIMINAL 
CONTEXT 
The attorney-client privilege is a historically rooted common law 
exception that has ethical implications for all lawyers.  Private lawyers 
and their respective clients have long enjoyed the fruits of this 
privilege.  For government lawyers, however, the privilege has not 
been observed with as much principled certainty despite the similarity 
in their occupation and professional responsibility requirements.  
Certainly, extending the privilege to government lawyers in the civil 
context has not been a contentious issue for the courts.306  The 
problem that has arisen is whether in the federal grand jury context 
the government attorney can assert the privilege.  While this is a 
narrow area of law to consider, it highlights just how cautious courts 
have been when abrogating or extending the privilege.  For the 
jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue, hesitation exists for 
government lawyers when deciding whether their communications 
with their clients are protected by the privilege.  This hesitation then 
spirals into an “uncertain privilege,” against which the Supreme 
Court has emphatically cautioned.307  The unfortunate results would 
include impeding effective government and subjugating the public 
interest.  Government officials, no matter their level of legal 
expertise, need adequate legal counsel to make informed decisions 
regarding their actions, particularly if there is potential for criminal 
liability. 
To avoid this problem, a return to focusing on the fundamental 
ethical considerations of the attorney-client privilege is necessary.  
The predominant principles and underlying rationales of the 
attorney-client privilege support that it applies to all attorneys, not 
just those in the private sector.308  In fact, it has been argued that it 
 
 304. See Moliterno, supra note 10, at 645. 
 305. Ellinwood, supra note 43, at 1318 (“Those officials who have clearly violated 
the law will not receive the benefit of government counsel so government resources 
will not be used for their assistance.”). 
 306. See discussion supra Part II. 
 307. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
 308. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 (2000).  
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may even have more validity “in the government context.”309  To see 
if the underlying principles apply, it is important first to identify who 
is the client that the lawyer is serving.310  Once the client is 
established, a government lawyer will know to what extent the 
privilege covers their communications with the client, and what 
inherent limitations exist.  The Supreme Court has made it clear there 
is no separate privilege that criminal and civil litigators enjoy.311  This 
is especially true in the realm of a government lawyer advocating on 
behalf of their client.  Obfuscating the privilege in the criminal 
context for these attorneys would “be a prohibition upon professional 
advice and assistance.”312 
The crime-fraud exception provides the necessary procedural 
safeguards to adequately serve the government lawyers potentially 
dual-hatted role of owing loyalty to the client and a “duty” to the 
people.313  It is one of the “well-established exceptions” to the 
privilege that Wright and Graham reference in their treatise.314  A 
faithful application of it would protect the public interest, while still 
providing the opportunity for “full and frank communications.”315  
The crime-fraud exception can discourage actions that would 
undermine the public interest by using the privilege to withhold 
information.  The crime-fraud exception also helps to prevent an 
abuse of the ethical role and responsibilities stemming from the 
attorney-client relationship.316 
A. The Client of a Government Attorney Is the Organization 
They Serve 
According to Model Rule 1.13, an attorney representing an 
organizational client “represents the organization acting through its 
duly authorized constituents.”317  For the government lawyer, this 
 
 309. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 310. Dickmann, supra note 20, at 314–15 (recommending that “government 
attorneys should warn government officials from the outset that they represent the 
governmental entity, not the individual official.”). 
 311. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408–09 (1998) (“However, 
there is no case authority for the proposition that the privilege applies differently in 
criminal and civil cases, and only one commentator ventures such a suggestion.”). 
 312. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 458 (1876). 
 313. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 535. 
 314. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49.  
 315. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 316. See Brown, supra note 111, at 1263.  
 317. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2012). 
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means that the privilege covers “communications made by 
subordinate officers . . . for purposes of enabling the attorney to give 
legal advice to the government, as an organization.”318  It is important 
for the government lawyer to avoid any potential conflicts of interest 
that might arise in representing the organization and/or the duly 
appointed constituent.319 
In these situations, the government lawyer should be “subject to 
the same ethical rules” as those serving in the private sector.320  The 
practical implications of this argument, however, are difficult to 
narrow to such a bright-line rule.  Often a government employee who 
is seeking advice from counsel will not necessarily know what they 
have done that could ultimately render them culpable.  Judge Tatel 
argues that this would create an unfortunate situation where the 
client is forced to “shift their trust . . . to private counsel.”321  This 
would undermine the public interest in open and honest government 
as the client would not bear the burden of disclosing communications 
that affect the citizenry.  Further, this would complicate the 
representation of counsel when it is unclear if civil or criminal liability 
is at stake.322 
There are times when the government attorney can “stand in the 
shoes of private counsel” and represent the employee in their 
individual litigation.323  It is important to note, however, that the 
privilege does not extend to a government official once they are “no 
longer in office.”324  A government entity’s capacity to waive the 
privilege stands as a safeguard in these situations where the public 
interest would be better served by disclosure of the information.  This 
effectively gives the government entity the ability to decide whether 
the “relevant public interests” are in line with their ability to assert 
the privilege.325  It cannot be presumed that the entity will always 
 
 318. See Paulsen, supra note 22, at 474. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Josephson & Pearce, supra note 4, at 541. 
 321. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 322. See Chud, supra note 21, at 1713–15. 
 323. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1269.  
 324. Ariel B. Denbo, Comment, In re Grand Jury Investigation: Do Government 
Officials Enjoy the Same Attorney-Client Privilege as Private Citizens?, 30 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 231, 240–41 (2006). 
 325. Blumenauer, supra note 15, at 78. 
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waive the privilege, however, and thus this does not render additional 
safeguards as superfluous.326  
B. The Underlying Principles Support the Privilege in the 
Federal Grand Jury Context 
There is little doubt that the attorney-client privilege is an 
important evidentiary tool that attorneys use.  Critics of the historical 
importance of the privilege do not dispute the need for the 
privilege.327  It is true that the privilege’s initial roots of honor and 
fealty have gone asunder.  They have been replaced, however, by 
ethical obligations, professional responsibility codes, and the desire to 
encourage “full and frank communications” with the client.328  
Encouraging clients to confide openly to their counsel serves the 
public interest.329  This is of paramount importance for a government 
attorney who advocates for an agency and through this representation 
represents the public. 
Critics of a robust government attorney privilege continually assert 
that government employees have unique obligations to serve the 
public.330  This uniqueness does not abrogate “the traditional duty of 
zealous advocacy.”331  Zealous representation directly conflicts with 
Professor Leslie’s argument that the privilege should be a limited 
justification employed only in trial preparation.332  Limiting the 
privilege to only those situations would deprive the client of the 
ability to receive the fullest scope of representation.  This would 
certainly impact the public interest, which is promoted when the 
client “receive[s] well-founded, fact-specific legal advice.”333  The 
drafters of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
recognized the privilege as a foundational element that impacts the 
 
 326. The Office of the Governor declined to waive the privilege in In re Grand 
Jury Investigation. 399 F.3d 527, 530 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 327. See Hazard, supra note 49, at 1062 (“There is no responsible opinion 
suggesting that the privilege be completely abolished.”).  
 328. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985). 
 329. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 330. See supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying notes. 
 331. Lanctot, supra note 281, at 1013. 
 332. See Leslie, supra note 69, at 528. 
 333. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 926 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(Kopf, J., dissenting). 
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adversarial process for both government lawyers and those in the 
private sector.334 
Though the privilege can stand in “derogation of the search for 
truth,” it serves as an inherent part of our adversarial system.  As 
noted previously, there are several limitations on the privilege that 
impact its potentially expansive reach.335  But even in the face of 
disclosure requirements for public requests of information, there have 
been carve-outs to protect the privilege.336  These exemptions give 
strength to the argument that the attorney-client privilege is a unique 
testamentary provision that remains viable even in a system of open 
government. 
Creating an “uncertain privilege” goes against the Court’s 
precedent and general matters of professional responsibility.337  
Allowing the privilege to be sustained in the federal grand jury 
context does not create an unnecessary expansion.  Though courts 
often have relied on “reason and experience” to decide the scope of 
the privilege in these circumstances, it is a fundamental principle of 
jurisprudence that reasonable minds can differ.338  This does not bode 
well for a government lawyer who may be called upon to disclose 
information during a highly contentious investigation.  While there is 
no doubt that the public has an interest in the fair adjudication of 
federal crimes, it should be strongly considered that the privilege 
already serves a narrow role.339 
Not allowing the privilege in the criminal context of a federal grand 
jury creates two problems.  First, it is almost certain to impede the 
government by imposing a “chilling effect” on attorney-client 
communications.340  Individuals seeking the counsel of an attorney 
will not always be certain of their guilt.  This uncertainty is certainly 
not a feature unique to those working with government lawyers.  The 
law is so varied and complex that it is essential for clients to receive 
information in a candid and confidential manner from attorneys so 
that they can make informed decisions regarding their prospective 
courses of action.  Though those involved in public corruption cases 
tend to be unsympathetic representatives of a strong attorney-client 
 
 334. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c 
(2000).   
 335. See supra Part I.D.  
 336. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 337. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996). 
 338. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 339. Diversified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977).  
 340. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
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privilege,341 a limitation of the privilege cannot be justified solely on 
this basis.  
Secondly, denying the privilege would lead to the creation of a 
demarcation line between the privilege asserted in civil litigation and 
criminal litigation.  Fracturing the privilege along types of litigation 
most likely results in impacting both “good faith” and bad faith 
requests for counsel.342  The principles supporting extension of the 
privilege to criminal investigations of government officials are not so 
far astray from those confronting private lawyers.  Judge Kopf argues 
that the lack of case law on point “is meaningless” in creating a 
“distinction for criminal cases” under Rule 503.343  There is little 
doubt that officials have a need for a “complete and accurate factual 
picture” in the face of a federal grand jury investigation.344  Forcing an 
immediate reliance upon private counsel in those situations would 
only exacerbate the uncertainty surrounding the privilege.  There is 
no principled basis for this proposition under the attorney-client 
privilege.  Our Constitution even offers some valid support to the 
privilege given its impact upon the assistance of counsel.345 
C. The Crime-Fraud Exception Is Sufficient to Protect the 
Public Interest 
Courts that have applied a balancing test to determine if the 
privilege should be abrogated in the face of a grand jury proceeding 
have failed to recognize that sufficient safeguards are in place to 
prevent an abuse of the privilege and a dilution of taxpayer’s funds in 
bad faith.  They argue that the public interest can only be served 
through full disclosure.  The controversy surrounding federal 
government attorney-client privilege involves the public’s concern 
over potential government secrecy.  James Madison’s letter quite 
possibly serves as a call to arms for proponents of this argument.346  
Courts have questioned how faithfully the public interest would be 
 
 341. Steven Yaccino, Then There Was One: An Illinois Ex-Governor Released 
from Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013, at A14 (noting that there have been “four 
Illinois governors who have been found guilty of wrongdoing in recent history, along 
with hundreds of public officials and business leaders charged with public corruption 
in recent decades”). 
 342. Damin, supra note 5, at 1033. 
 343. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 929 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(Kopf, J., dissenting). 
 344. Id. at 930. 
 345. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 346. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273–74 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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served by allowing the privilege in the grand jury context.347  But, if 
this is true, then what becomes of the right to secrecy in what can be 
considered the most adversarial of proceedings? 
The crime-fraud exception addresses the public interest concern 
wholly.  By not allowing the “seal of secrecy” to extend to 
communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud, the public’s 
interest is served.348  This “ensure[s] that the truth is revealed in 
situations where a compelling public good” is in conflict with a 
client’s invocation of the privilege.349  Invoking the exception would 
also avoid any unnecessary judicial balancing in determining 
competing public interests.  All a court would have to do is determine 
if the party asserting the crime-fraud exception had met their prima 
facie showing and proceed forward with their inspection of the 
communication.  These procedural protections would allow a neutral 
member of the court to consider the weight of the evidence in 
determining if the privilege can be pierced. 
It is true that other reporting requirements limit the privilege in 
criminal investigations of wrongdoing.350  The Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers does recognize the impact of statutory 
obligations on the privilege.351  The fact that these reporting 
requirements exist, however, shows the strength of the privilege 
rather than its weakness.  If the privilege were weakened in this 
context, then having statutorily imposed reporting requirements 
would be superfluous at best.  That is why the crime-fraud exception 
can be utilized to protect the privilege from abuse.  It is not necessary 
to employ a balancing test to determine if the privilege should be 
overcome, the crime-fraud exception serves that purpose already.352 
Employing the crime-fraud exception is not a very arduous burden 
for opposing counsel to overcome if that is necessary.  Moreover, it 
serves as a sufficient safeguard to prevent the privilege from 
becoming absolute.  For those concerned with the abrogation of the 
privilege, the crime-fraud exception does not result in the immediate 
release of confidential information to opposing counsel.353  This 
 
 347. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920–21. 
 348. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
 349. Dickmann, supra note 20, at 295. 
 350. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1274–75. 
 351. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 cmt. b (2000) 
(“A narrower privilege for governmental clients may be warranted by particular 
statutory formulations.”). 
 352. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 936. 
 353. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989). 
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review of the communications over which confidentiality is claimed 
allows the court to determine whether the necessity exists under this 
exception to admit the material.  Having this power concentrated in 
the court keeps the system of employing the exception from 
becoming arbitrary.  Again, while reasonable minds can differ, it is 
quite possible that courts evaluating communications for evidence of 
crime or fraud will “know it when [they] see it.”354 
CONCLUSION 
Government lawyers play an integral part in our democratic 
system.  It is therefore imperative that the officials they serve are able 
to discuss legal matters with them under the protections of the 
attorney-client privilege.  Depriving them of this capacity would force 
the government official to seek advice outside the system of public 
accountability.355  This consequence could make “government[] 
investigations more difficult” or render them “impossible.”356  The 
result would contradict the public interest for which these officials 
and lawyers are duty-bound to serve.357 
The fundamental principles of the privilege do not support its 
limitation for government clients in the face of a federal grand jury 
subpoena.  There is no reason to “jettison a principle” as essential to 
responsible lawyering as the attorney-client privilege.358  The ability of 
the agency to waive the privilege only serves to show how critical it is 
to promoting attorney-client communications.  It is unnecessary to 
create more exceptions to the privilege than necessary.359  The 
primary role of the privilege is to encourage open and honest 
dialogue between government lawyers and the individual seeking 
assistance.  Only when the opposing counsel satisfies their prima facie 
showing should procedural steps be taken to overcome the privilege.  
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege achieves 
this process.  Anything else would be a “derogation of the public 
interest.”360 
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